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Abstract
The paper analyzes the European Community/ European Union experience in the Western Balkans 
in the period from 1990 onwards in different context in order to assess different mechanisms which 
the European Union has gained with building the Common Foreign and Security Policy and within 
the Enlargement Policy in the process of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Additionally, the 
paper makes an assessment of the EU’s involvement in the conflict prevention and conflict resolution 
in the Balkans after the Stabilization and Association Process was launched in 1999.
The authors argue that in the case of the military conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, when the 
European Community was confronted with serious and hard security issues at the very beginning of 
creating its Common Foreign and Security Policy and in a period of time when the region was not 
part of the enlargement process, the Community and the Union afterwards proved to be extremely 
ineffective. In the second part, through three case studies, the paper demonstrate that with the 
combined use of CFSP mechanisms and SAP, positive examples of the EU acting as a provider of 
peaceful dispute settlement in the Western Balkans have been established.
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Introduction
Тhe words of the Iron Chancellor Otto von Bismarck are relevant even 
today: “Europe today is a powder keg and the leaders are like men 
smoking in an arsenal … A single spark will set off an explosion that will 
consume us all … I cannot tell you when that explosion will occur, but I 
can tell you where … Some damned foolish thing in the Balkans will set 
it off.” (Navrozov 2008). In the heart of Europe, instability in the Balkans 
entails dangerous spill-over effects into the Union in terms of organized 
crime, refugee flows and migratory pressures amongst others. Therefore, 
conflict prevention and conflict resolution in its neighbourhood constitute 
key external priorities of the European Union (EU). 
Since the EU’s approach to violent ethnic conflicts has been born and bred 
in the Balkans, this paper will attempt to compare the EU’s experience 
in this region throughout time and in different contexts in order to assess 
the different mechanisms which the EU has employed in formulating the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and within the Enlargement 
Policy in the process of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. It 
covers the period from 1990 onwards, when the dissolution of the former 
Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began. It will focus on the 
European Community’s (EC) and afterwards the EU’s role in the conflicts 
in former Yugoslavia in the period when the CFSP was created. The paper 
will then assess the EU’s involvement in conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution in the Balkans after the Stabilization and Association Process 
(SAP) was launched in 1999. It shows that the EU changed its role in the 
region due to the fact that the newly formed independent republics 
existing in a completely different political context ten years later, have 
greater incentive to become EU member states and be part of the EU 
market, but also due to the fact that the EU was equipped with several 
mechanisms that made it more effective when it came to the institutional 
shortcomings of the past with the Amsterdam Treaty which entered into 
force in 1999, and afterwards with the Lisbon Treaty entering into force in 
2009.
The authors argue that in the case of the military conflicts that followed 
the SFRY disintegration, when the EC was confronted with serious security 
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issues at the very beginning of creating its CFSP and in a period when the 
region was not part of the enlargement process, the EC and EU afterwards 
proved to be extremely ineffective. The lack of unity among member 
states on the issues connected to the conflicts in SFRY also contributed 
towards the ineffectiveness of EC/EU actions. Moreover, without the 
proper mechanisms to act, the leverage of the EC and afterwards the 
EU had little impact on the process of resolving the crisis. The EC/EU was 
unable to use its enlargement policy in the case of former Yugoslavia also 
because of the fact that the country had no interest in becoming an EC 
member state and neither did its republics. In the second part, through 
three case studies, the paper will show that with the combined use of CFSP 
mechanisms and SAP, positive examples of the EU acting as a provider 
of peaceful dispute settlement in the Western Balkans are established. 
Under the changed circumstances ten years later and in a different 
context in the Balkans, using its conditionality policy and the ‘proverbial 
carrot’ of candidate status, the EU was instrumental in brokering the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement which ended the conflict in the Republic 
of Macedonia in 2001; the Belgrade Agreement in 2002 that prevented 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from violently falling apart and having 
a knock-on effect on the weak balance in Kosovo; and, finally, the 
landmark Brussels Agreement on normalizing the relations between Serbia 
and Kosovo. The latter agreement closed one of the most complicated 
chapters in the collapse of Yugoslavia. The prospect of concluding a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement and eventual EU membership 
for the newly formed independent states of former Yugoslavia, which did 
not have the big market of the former Federation to rely on, was used 
as strong leverage in persuading the parties to engage in negotiations 
that would lead to conflict prevention and conflict resolution. One of the 
main obstacles the EU faced in this process as well was the disunity of its 
member states – in the case of the dissolution of SFRY and in the Kosovo 
conflict. Because of a lack of unanimity among the member states, it 
cost the EU more time in the process of conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution. Finally, through analysis of the EU’s conflict prevention and 
conflict resolution role in the Western Balkans after the creation of the 
SAP, the paper will also assess the role of the EU’s High Representative and 
afterwards the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
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EC/EU role in the conflicts following the dissolution 
of SFRY
The former Yugoslav federation comprised six constituent republics: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia 
and Slovenia. Serbia also had two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and 
Vojvodina. Although nationalistic sentiment was present throughout 
Yugoslav history, it was efficiently supressed by Tito’s regime. Following 
his death in 1980, there was a resurgence of nationalist sentiment 
in the republics, which resulted in a demand for transformation of 
the country’s political framework. By the end of 1990, inter-republic 
negotiations had been initiated with the sole purpose of finding a 
mutually acceptable solution for their future. Unfortunately, their 
divergent plans for the future, from independence of the republics 
(Slovenia and Croatia), establishing a looser confederation of 
independent republics (Bosnia and Hercegovina and Macedonia) 
and eventually federation (Serbia and Montenegro) could not be 
conciliated through negotiations and resulted in the biggest military 
conflict in Europe since World War II. 
However, the main factor that led to this conflict was the fact that the 
borders of the republics did not correspond to the distribution of the 
various nationalities within the SFRY that also suffered from deep-seated 
historic antagonisms. The presence of a significant Serbian minority in 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Croatian minority in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and moreover, the Serbian policy to establish a ‘greater 
Serbia’ by annexing Serbian-populated territory from within Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was the other factor that contributed to the 
lengthy multi-ethnic conflicts (Brsakoska Bazerkoska 2016). 
In June 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, 
strong opposition from the Serb-dominated federal government and from 
Serbia, led to a military intervention by federal forces in Slovenia.1 Almost 
immediately after the war ended in Slovenia, military conflict broke 
1 The Slovenian independence war lasted ten days, from 27 June to 7 July 1991, and ended with the signing of the Brioni 
Agreement, brokered under the political sponsorship of the European Community.
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out in Croatia.2 This escalating war continued throughout Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.3 Only the Republic of Macedonia gained independence by 
peaceful means, while the two other republics – Serbia and Montenegro – 
formed a federation known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992. 
The interest of the EC for the future of Yugoslavia and the prevention of 
the potential conflicts among the republics was present from the very 
beginning of the crisis in the first half of 1991. The process of dissolution 
of Yugoslavia matched with one of the biggest transformations of 
international politics in the twentieth century. It seemed that the key 
political actors, including the EC, were overwhelmed with the new 
situation that unfolded in a matter of months – from the fall of the Berlin 
wall and the unification of Germany to the beginning of the transition of 
communist societies to democracy and a market economy. Europe was 
strongly focused on the process of democratic transformation in Eastern 
Europe and at the beginning the situation in Yugoslavia was perceived as 
a collateral issue compared to the other emerging challenges such as the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union or the Gulf War. Additionally, the unfolding 
of the Yugoslav crisis coincided with the final negotiations for the design 
of the Treaty of the European Union, a document that based the future 
of the EC on the three-pillar system that included the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. All these factors made the EC/EU more reliant on help 
from outside (mainly from the US), than capable of relying on the newly 
formed mechanisms.
During the EPC Ministerial meeting held on 26 March 1991, a conclusion 
that the preservation of SFRY represented the primary goal of the 
Community was adopted. The EC had continuously monitored the 
deteriorating situation in the country (EC 1991a; 1991b) and on 29 May 
1991, Jacques Santer, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister and at the time 
holding the presidency of the Council of the European Community, and 
Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission, met with 
leaders in Yugoslavia with an offer of accelerated EC membership and 
considerable financial assistance in return for a peaceful solution to the 
2 The Croatian independence war lasted until 1995 and led to hundreds of thousands of refugees and revived the 
memories of the brutalities of World War II.
3 Following Bosnia and Herzegovina’s declaration of independence the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina started in 1992 
and ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. The brutality of the war in Bosnia was accompanied with 
massive crimes against humanity and war crimes, such as widespread killings, rapes, torture, deportation to camps 
and the siege of towns.
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crisis (Gligorov 2000). The EC membership was not a priority for the leaders 
of the Yugoslav republics at that time, when heated nationalistic rhetoric 
was ongoing. In June 1991, Slovenian and Croatian unilateral acts of 
independence were passed. This only further escalated tensions.
After a number of unsuccessful attempts and appeals to maintain peace 
(EC 1991c; 1991d; 1991e), on 27 August 1991 the EC decided to convene 
a Peace Conference4 and to establish an Arbitration Commission that 
was expected to enhance the rule of law in the settlement of differences 
relating to the Yugoslav crisis (EC 1991f). The Arbitration Commission 
consisted of the presidents of the Constitutional courts of Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain. In the period from 1991-1993 the Commission 
adopted 15 legal opinions including opinions regarding the recognition 
of the Yugoslav republics. The new EC approach represented a result of 
the determination to avoid sending mixed and often conflicting signals in 
respect to the solution of the crisis; in particular this referred to Germany, 
as well as the tendency to limit potential US involvement in the overall 
process. Additionally, the Peace Conference represented an opportunity 
to test the new emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Lord Carrington presided over the Conference on Yugoslavia, which 
commenced on 7 September 1991. However, as a result of Serbian and 
Montenegrin discontent, Lord Carrington’s peace plan draft was later 
rejected and consequently, the last opportunity to preserve Yugoslavia 
as a sovereign state or as a union of states failed.
Bearing in mind the unsuccessful attempts to bring an end to the conflicts 
in former Yugoslavia in the second half of 1991 and the failure to reach 
a peace agreement at the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, the EC 
decided to open the procedure of recognition of the “new” states. During 
the Ministerial meeting held from 15-16 December 1991, the EC adopted 
two documents regarding the international recognition of the new states: 
the Guidelines for the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union, and the Declaration Concerning the Condition for 
Recognition of New States. 
4 The Peace Conference brought together the Federal Presidency and the Federal Government of Yugoslavia, the 
presidents of the six Yugoslav republics, the President of the EC Council, and representatives of the EC Commission 
and EC member states. 
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These two documents, together with the Arbitration Commission, created 
the mechanism which managed the process of recognition of all Yugoslav 
republics. Four Yugoslav republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia and Slovenia – have submitted requests for international 
recognition. However, on the last day of the deadline, before the 
official opinion of the Arbitration Commission was prepared, Germany 
announced the “Christmas recognition” of Slovenia and Croatia. 
Undoubtedly, this defiant and controversial approach undermined the 
EC’s struggle to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy and in 
particular its attempt to prove to the international community, and mainly 
the United States, that Europe was able to maintain a joint position on key 
international challenges.
On 11 January 1992 the Arbitration Commission handed down the opinions 
regarding the applications of the four Yugoslav republics in which it 
concluded that only Slovenia and Macedonia had fulfilled the recognition 
criteria. Still, on 15 January 1992 the EC Presidency decided to recognize 
Slovenia and Croatia only (EC 1992a). Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
recognized as an independent state by the EC on 6 April 1992 (EC 1992b). 
As Shaw suggested, the recognition of Croatia and Bosnia represented 
a clear example of premature recognition due to the fact that neither 
country had effective control of its territory – Croatia did not control one-
third of its territory, and before the signing of the Dayton peace agreement 
Bosnia did not control almost 70 per cent of its territory (Shaw 1997).
Under intense pressure from Germany, the EC and its member states 
recognised Croatia and Slovenia as independent states. By doing so, 
they partly ignored the opinion issued from its own Arbitration Commission 
that Macedonia and Slovenia were the only two republics that met all 
the criteria to be recognised as new states. According to Blockmans 
(2014), “the political impact of these measures on the dissolution and the 
war in Yugoslavia was significant, because it isolated and punished the 
Serb/Montenegrin-dominated federal authorities and it also ended the 
European stewardship of the international efforts to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement to the conflict, due to Serbia’s distrust of the EC as a mediator.” 
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EU role after 1995 - a need for a stronger US presence
It became evident that the positions of the key European states were 
dominating the situation rather than there being a unified joint response. 
In particular, this refers to the German Christmas recognition of Slovenia 
and Croatia which by-passed the Arbitration Commission mechanism. It 
could be concluded that the EC policy in respect to the beginning of the 
Yugoslav crisis could be determined by the following factors: a lack of 
mechanisms for a joint European response; an inclination of domination 
of a few European countries in particular Germany; and finally, the EC/EU 
membership not being an incentive for the newly-formed states.
For that reason, the US decided to make an effort to end the war raging 
through the territory of the former SFRY. In November 1995 in Dayton, after 
four years of war and numerous atrocities, the peace initiative that was 
undertaken by the United States supported by the UN Security Council 
and the Contact Group, finally resulted in a ceasefire agreement.
Being unable to deal with the conflicts in its backyard was seen as a failure 
for the EU. Although it was freshly equipped with the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and having confidence that “the hour of Europe has 
dawned”5 (Gligorov 2000), the EU was incapable of stopping the brutal 
breakdown of former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (Blockmans 2014). 
Since the EU was unable to put in effect the newly defined CFSP to 
deal with the war in Yugoslavia, it prompted the EU leaders to rethink 
the mechanisms in the treaties, in order to strongly engage the EU in 
global peace diplomacy. The Treaty of Amsterdam redefined both the 
instruments and the decision-making procedures of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. One of the novelties introduced by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam which pushed the EU’s diplomatic role on the international 
scene was the introduction of the High Representative for the CFSP, who 
at the same time held the position of the Council’s Secretary General.
Once again, the changes and innovations within the EU, this time with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, were put to the test with the new violent conflict 
5 In May 1991, Jacques Poos, one of the negotiators of the Brioni Agreement that ended the ten-day war in Slovenia in 
1991, declared: “The hour of Europe has dawned.”
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at the end of the 1990s in Kosovo. The conflict in Kosovo and its struggle 
for self-rule began in 1998. However, it was too soon for all the novelties 
introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam to be put into action especially 
given the violence of the conflict. Therefore, the EU once again needed 
US assistance in the resolution of the conflict. The conflict ended one year 
later with the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
in Kosovo.
Once the war in former Yugoslavia was over, the EU was presented with 
a new opportunity in the Balkans. The political landscape in the Balkans 
had changed – the new states which did not rely on the large market of 
the Federation, exhausted by the war that raged on their territories for a 
decade, presented the EU with a completely different political context for 
its conflict prevention and conflict resolution mechanisms. The EU, on the 
other hand, was now equipped with the CFSP mechanisms, as well as with 
the appeal of the enlargement policy which proved to be very successful 
in the Eastern European countries. And finally, by introducing the High 
Representative for the CFSP, the role of the EU in conflict prevention and 
conflict resolution in the Balkans was strengthened. All these factors – the 
changed political context in the Balkans, together with the higher EU 
leverage provided through its newly introduced mechanisms – resulted 
in a more effective engagement of the EU. The next part of the article 
will analyze the role of the EU in conflict prevention and conflict resolution 
in the Balkans in a changed environment for the newly-formed countries 
and for the EU. 
The EU’s second chance in the Balkans
Introducing the SAP - the additional tool for conflict prevention 
and conflict resolution?
In view of the EU’s acknowledged failure to deal with the unfolding tragedy 
of Yugoslavia’s disintegration in the 1990s, the EU was determined to 
contribute to the stabilization of the region and to restore external credibility 
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in the Balkans, which had been lost during the wars in the ex-Yugoslav 
republics. The success in the Western Balkans was long perceived as a test 
for the effectiveness of EU foreign policy. Therefore, the EU designed the 
process of Stabilization and Association especially for the Western Balkan 
countries. It was tailored in a manner to be suitable for the process of post-
communist transition, post-war reconciliation and EU integration.
In 1993, at the Copenhagen Council, the EU member states agreed 
that the Central and East European countries could join the EU and put 
forward certain criteria to be met before accession (European Council 
1993). The Copenhagen criteria have been accepted as the main point 
of reference when assessing the success of the individual candidates’ 
countries development and progress towards EU membership. In this way, 
the EU had great influence on the outcome of the reform efforts in the 
individual candidate countries. The most important part of that process 
is the fact that, apart from the long-term membership perspective, the 
enlargement process brings numerous short and medium-term benefits. 
Those benefits include financial aid, policy advice, political cooperation, 
technical assistance as well as visa liberalisation. 
The enlargement context in the Western Balkans has changed, mainly 
because the region is characterized by legacies of war and a political 
climate that enabled the flourishing of organized crime, corruption and 
illegal migration. The EU first had to stabilize the region after the dissolution 
of the SFRY and then associate the newly emerged countries. The 
Stabilization and Association Process was launched in 1999 and granted 
the countries from the Western Balkans the status of potential candidate 
countries. In 2003, the Thessaloniki Agenda promoted political dialogue 
and cooperation in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), the strengthening of parliamentary cooperation and institution 
building (Council of the European Union 2003). The basic starting point for 
the SAP is the EU’s security framework. According to Chris Patten (2002), 
then EU Commissioner for External Relations:
“The choice for us in this case is very clear: either we export stability 
to the Balkans, or the Balkans export instability to us. I know which 
I would prefer. 
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There is one more lesson I take from the Balkans today: never, 
never, never give up. Because what is happening in this region 
today shows how it is possible to turn failed states into successful 
states, how it is possible to fashion hope out of despair, how it is 
possible to make a difference. We have a long way to go in the 
Balkans: but we are getting there.”
Therefore, the EU conditionality policy in the Balkans was designed 
as a multi-dimensional instrument directed towards reconciliation, 
reconstruction and reform. In addition to the 1993 Copenhagen 
criteria, the Western Balkans countries are expected to meet additional 
criteria that are country-specific and mainly linked to different peace 
agreements;6 the promotion of regional cooperation and reconciliation 
is also expected.
The ‘proverbial carrot’ of future membership in the EU gives the much-
needed efficiency to the SAP. By using both positive conditionality 
entailing the promise of a certain benefit in return for the fulfilment of 
a predetermined condition, or negative conditionality involving the 
infliction of a punishment or sanction in the event a specified obligation 
was violated (the EU has the option to freeze the financial assets for that 
country when it fails to meet the objectives) the conditionality policy 
within the Western Balkan countries has been used very effectively in the 
process of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. In the three cases 
that will be elaborated below, both the EU’s Special Representatives 
(EUSRs) as well as the High Representative have played a role. 
After the SAP was launched in 1999, on three different occasions the 
European Union was faced with the possibility of new conflicts in the 
Balkans. The EU used several incentives in the conflict prevention and 
conflict resolution in the Balkans: signing the SAA, visa free regimes, 
candidate status, starting negotiations, as well as the political and 
personal influence of the High Representative and of specially 
appointed Special Representatives. The three cases that will be 
elaborated further are the following: the EU’s role in the latent conflict 
in the Republic of Macedonia, the process of conflict prevention and 
the creation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, and finally 
6 UN Resolution 1244; Dayton Agreement; Ohrid Agreement; Belgrade Agreement; Brussels Agreement.
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its role in the process of brokering an agreement on normalizing the 
relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
The conflict in the Republic of Macedonia 
The first country to conclude the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
in 2001 was the Republic of Macedonia. It was also the third republic of 
the former SFRY to achieve candidate status.7 According to Michael Sahlin 
(2007: 103–108), the former EU Special Representative to the Republic of 
Macedonia:
“In that sense the political stability, inter-ethnic harmony, progress 
and ultimately EU accession of Macedonia has become a prestige 
matter for the EU… Macedonia’s crisis and post-crisis experience 
as well as her initial accession experience… coincides generically 
and in time with important steps in the evolution of the EU’s 
policies of enlargement and of crisis management institutional 
and capacity enhancement.”
Both the EU enlargement policy and the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy were influenced and in some ways redefined by EU involvement 
in Macedonia. Macedonia negotiated the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement during 1999 and 2000 and the Agreement was due to be 
signed during the spring of 2001. However, at the beginning of 2001, the 
country slid into an armed conflict. The Kosovo crisis in 1999 had a huge 
influence on the region and on the Republic of Macedonia as well. The 
crisis gave rise to an enormous influx of ethnic Albanian refugees, which 
threatened the fragile ethnic balance of Macedonia. It damaged the 
economy and weakened the government (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 
2006: 81). The call of the Albanian minority for greater representation 
in the state system triggered the conflict in Macedonia that brought 
the country to the brink of civil war in 2001. The conflict took the EU by 
surprise and the Swedish Presidency at the time decided to use the closer 
relationship with the EU as an alternative to war (Giandomenico 2009: 
89-112). In the Macedonian case, the EU used the so-called European 
perspective as a conflict management tool. One of the reasons this conflict 
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management tool was effective was that this approach was accepted 
by the Macedonian government. Following the intense negotiations and 
‘shuttle diplomacy’ between Skopje and Brussels, the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement was signed in Ohrid in August 2001. 
From that point, besides the essential Copenhagen criteria, the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement became another tool of measuring the progress 
that the country makes towards fulfilling the conditions for EU membership, 
and it was a very important one. For the EU, it was important to achieve 
success in the Balkans, where it had historically been mainly passive. 
Therefore, in 2005, despite the fact that Macedonia did not reach the 
required quality of state administration, elections and other important 
issues, the EU member states had little option but to grant candidate 
status because of the progress regarding the implementation of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement. Even today, the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
remains an essential element for democracy and rule of law assessment 
in the country.
According to Sahlin (2007: 103-108), the EU actions in Macedonia were a 
very special case of what can be seen as comparatively successful conflict 
prevention and crisis management. This was a huge investment for the 
EU. Moreover, European action in Macedonia was closely connected to 
protecting the Ohrid Framework Agreement as a symbol for the successful 
conflict management carried out by the EU.
Within the general enlargement process of the EU, the countries were 
rarely discussed individually. However, EU involvement in Macedonia was 
vast. The High Representative Javier Solana confirmed this commitment 
of the EU (Solana 2001): 
“The European Union will now redouble its efforts in supporting 
the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement and will give priority 
to help bring Macedonia closer to the EU, as foreseen in the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement… I will myself continue 
to help the implementation process where I can, assisted by 
my Special Representative in Skopje, Alain Le Roy, and in close 
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In 2004, the society was once again on the brink of another crisis as a 
referendum was called to put a stop to the process of redistributing the 
powers from central government to the newly created local authorities, 
as part of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The Commission Delegation in 
Skopje was very active in supporting this process and, using its conditionality 
policy and the ‘carrot’ of the candidate status, the EU managed to 
pressure the government to proceed with what was seen as a painful 
process of decentralization.8 Although the granting of candidate status to 
the Republic of Macedonia in 2005 was seen as recognition of important 
progress, particularly regarding the inter-ethnic situation, the absence of 
membership negotiations until this day reflects some serious weaknesses. 
An additional condition to begin the negotiations was imposed on the 
Republic of Macedonia: a resolution of the name issue with neighbouring 
Greece. Once again, the EU member states’ inability to reach a consensus 
on the name issue between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece 
prolonged the integration process of this small country in the Balkans. The 
lack of a European perspective opened the way for authoritarianism in 
Macedonia and contributed towards the building of a captured state 
phenomenon.9
Saving the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
After dealing successfully with the conflict in the Republic of Macedonia, 
but with the fresh memory of the bloody dissolution of the former Yugoslav 
federation, the EU had an interest in preventing a further break-up of 
Yugoslavia. This was considered to be quite a controversial issue (Tocci 
2007: 78-100). As a federal state constructed by Serbia and Montenegro, 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was created in 1992. One of 
the imperatives to pursue domestic reforms, to cope with the internal 
political problems and to proceed with European integration was to 
have a functional federal state between Serbia and Montenegro. In the 
autumn of 2001, Belgrade was becoming increasingly willing to allow 
for a referendum in Montenegro, since there was a growing feeling 
that Montenegrin independence would put an end to the political and 
constitutional stalemate. However, at that point in time, Montenegrin 
8 The proposed law was designed partly to give communes with an Albanian majority the right of self-governance.
9 This is a description of the country which is given in the Progress Report by the European Commission. It is supposed to 
designate a state where there is a long-lasting bifurcation of state and the party.
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independence was an unwelcome development because the EU was 
not ready to deal with Kosovo and a new federal state could provide 
a framework for the reintegration of Kosovo. According to Tocci (ibid.), 
“the EU feared that the disintegration of the Western Balkans had not yet 
reached the smallest matrioshka doll and that further fragmentation could 
have triggered renewed violence and instability in the war-torn region.”
In this case, it was the EU’s High Representative Javier Solana who was 
heavily involved in the negotiations. He was instrumental in brokering the 
Belgrade Agreement on 14 March 2002. The Agreement gave birth to 
the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, which was named ‘Solania’ 
because of Solana’s involvement. After two years, it became apparent 
that the new problematic union arrangement did not resolve the 
significant political and structural differences between the two republics, 
but it managed to introduce a three-year period of cooling off before 
Serbia and Montenegro could start the peaceful separation.
Consequently, Montenegro seceded and declared independence in 
2006. Although the State Union between Serbia and Montenegro did not 
last long, the EU’s involvement contributed towards its peaceful dissolution 
and provided for a relatively tension-free secession of Montenegro.
EU in Kosovo after the Lisbon Treaty
Its failure in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 gave the EU greater incentive to 
become involved in the process of reconstruction of Kosovo afterwards 
through different mechanisms. Although, the EU was mainly working in 
close cooperation with other international organisation in Kosovo, its 
involvement had different shapes and roles. Primarily, the EU was involved 
in the fourth pillar of UNMIK which dealt with privatization and regulatory 
issues and then the establishment of the EU Monitoring Mission. Some 
emergency programmes were implemented by the European Commission 
Task Force and then by the newly established European Agency for 
Reconstruction. By 2004, the EU’s High Representative Javier Solana 
dispatched a personal representative and the European Commission 
opened a Liaison Office in Pristina. 
The violent clashes between the Serb and Albanian communities in 
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March 2004 made it clear that the status quo could not be maintained. 
The Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) to 
Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, and the Head of UNMIK, Kai Eide, urged to have 
the negotiations on Kosovo’s final status opened without delay (Eide 2005). 
The talks between Belgrade and Pristina began, led by the former Finnish 
President Martti Ahtisaari, who was assisted by two high ranking EU officials 
– one from the Council and one from the Commission. Ahtisaari presented 
his Comprehensive Proposal in March 2007. In his report, Martti Ahtisaari 
recommended a conditioned independence of Kosovo, supervised by 
the international community (International Crisis Group 2007). He argued 
that it was the only option, since the reintegration into Serbia was not 
viable and the continuation of the international administration was not 
sustainable (ibid.).
There are numerous discrepancies between the EU member states when 
it comes to the issue of the Kosovo status. The countries facing problems 
of national minorities at home (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and 
Spain) were sympathetic to the Serbian claim for territorial integrity. 
As the former EU Representative to the final status talks, Stefan Lehne 
explains: “As long as the Contact Group remained operational, the 
Council of the EU found it relatively easy to bridge the internal divisions 
by simply mirroring the Contact Group’s positions in its own statements. 
After [UN Chief Negotiatior Martti] Ahtisaari submitted his proposal the EU 
still managed to agree to support the proposal (which did not explicitly 
mention independence), while emphasizing the need for a UN Security 
Council decision” (Lehne 2009), which never came. As the resolution of 
the issue in Kosovo was of pivotal importance for the EU, which had failed 
previously in Bosnia and had to leave the driving seat to the United States, 
High Representative Solana stepped in. He opened up the possibility 
of by-passing the Security Council Resolution: if Russia, as a traditional 
partner of Serbia, continued to block the Resolution within the UNSC, then 
the EU would take its own decision (Koeth 2010: 227-247). He was backed 
by the then Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn who was stating that 
“Kosovo is a profoundly European matter” (Rehn 2007).
By the beginning of 2008, it was more than apparent that the authorities in 
Pristina would declare independence. This fact divided the EU, especially 
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since five of its member states10 announced that they would never 
recognize Kosovo’s independence without a new UNSC Resolution. The 
EU’s answer to the forthcoming unilateral declaration of independence 
by Kosovo was to accelerate the deployment of the mission before the 
independence, so EULEX would not become involved in a following 
row over the non-recognition (Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012: 746-763). 
Deploying the EULEX mission in this manner meant that it was departing 
from the mission’s primary origin as a mission serving the Ahtisaari 
proposal for Kosovo’s supervised independence. This solution, together 
with the appointment of only one person to serve as both the EU Special 
Representative and the International Civilian Representative (ICR) in 
Kosovo11 showed clearly the EU’s systemic shortcomings regarding Kosovo.
Another challenge for the EU after the unilateral declaration of 
independence by Kosovo was the prevention of a future conflict between 
the Serbian minority living in Kosovo and Kosovo’s Albanian majority. 
After the International Court of Justice (2010) issued the advisory opinion 
on Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2010, the EU had another 
chance in Kosovo. The EU had to find a way to bring both Serbia and 
Kosovo to the negotiating table to find a way to normalise their relations 
and to prevent future conflicts. The EU’s readiness to facilitate a dialogue 
between Serbia and Kosovo was welcomed by the UN General Assembly’s 
Resolution 298 (2010).
The talks led by the EU were perceived as a factor for peace, security and 
stability in the Balkan region. The ‘First Agreement on Principles Governing 
the Normalisation of Relations’ between Serbia and Kosovo (the Brussels 
Agreement) was concluded on 19 April 2013 at the headquarters of 
the EEAS in Brussels. This deal for normalization of relations between 
Serbia and Kosovo offers the possibility to close another chapter in the 
recent violent history of the Balkans. Catherine Ashton’s leadership and 
dedication played a significant role in the positive outcome of the EU-
facilitated dialogue. The main incentive for Kosovo offered by the EU was 
the possible opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement, while Serbia was offered the prospect of starting membership 
10 Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain
11 ICR was heading the International Civil Office, which was an institution not mandated by the UN. However, it reported 
to the International Steering Group of countries that supported Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. The 
ICR mandate ended on 10 September 2012.
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talks with the EU. Ashton’s efforts were backed by both the Commission 
and the member states, especially by Germany. At that point, there 
was a strong consensus among the EU member states that the Kosovo–
Serbia relations should be normalized, especially since good neighbourly 
relations were added as one of the criteria for the advancement on the 
EU integration path. The Brussels Agreement brought Kosovo closer to 
signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, while 
Serbia received the ‘carrot’ of starting the screening process which 
precedes accession negotiations with the EU. The SAA between Kosovo 
and the EU came into force in April 2016 and Serbia began the accession 
negotiations in January 2014.
Conclusions
Regarding the more difficult security issues, the EU’s approach in dealing 
with them is often perceived as weak. This was once again proven in the 
case of the conflicts that raged in the Balkans in the past two decades. 
The war in former Yugoslavia was one of the greatest failures of the EC/
EU diplomacy and can be contributed to several factors – lack of suitable 
mechanisms for conflict prevention and conflict resolution, lack of 
alertness, lack of institutional capacity when it comes to the EU institutions, 
as well as the lack of the appeal of the EU membership at that point in 
time for the Yugoslav republics and the lack of consent of the parties to 
be mediated by the EU. The EU was faced with the dissolution of SFRY 
at the inception of its existence at the beginning of the 1990s. The CFSP 
mechanisms were just starting to build and grow, and the prospect of 
future EU membership was not as tempting and important as for today’s 
independent republics.
In any case, the EU’s efforts were strengthened throughout the years. 
After the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force in 1999, the EU did score 
successes in the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Balkans, such as 
the case of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement and the 2002 Belgrade 
Agreement. With the Lisbon Treaty entering into force, the EU was equipped 
with several mechanisms that made it more effective when it came to 
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the institutional shortcomings of the past. Therefore, the EU-facilitated 
dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo stands out as a success. It is both 
the outcome and also the characteristics of the diplomatic process itself 
that led to the successful Brussels Agreement in 2013. It was a high-level 
and high-paced diplomatic process. The facilitated dialogue showed 
that the EU could use the prospect of closer relations as a powerfull tool 
to convince third parties to settle their disputes peacefully. 
Finally, the EU still needs to tackle one issue that makes conflict prevention 
and conflict resolution more time-consuming and sometimes unsuccessful: 
the lack of unity among member states on how a strategy to tackle and 
resolve disputes on the borders of the EU should be defined. It is difficult 
to have a strategy for conflict prevention and conflict resolution abroad 
when the EU is divided. When the big countries pursue their own interests 
and the smaller member states block decisions in order to draw attention 
to their own concerns, the EU can achieve little. One of the reasons for 
the high-profile failures of EU peace diplomacy during the break-off of the 
former Yugoslav Federation was the disunity of the member states. 
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